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MODERN SOCIETY AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE 
By Zdenko Roter 
Dr. Zdenko Rater (Marxist) is a professor of sociology and the Dean of the 
School of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism of the University of Ljubljana in 
Yugoslavia. He received his educational at University of Ljubljana and his Ph.D. in' 
sociology of religion at University of Sarajevo and did some poshdoctoral work in France. 
A participant of Christian Marxist dialogues for many years he has published Cerkev in 
sodobni svet [Church and the Contemporary World] and Katoliska cerkev in drzava v 
Jugoslaviji [The Catholic Church and State in Yugoslavia] and many articles including, "A 
Marxist View of Christianity" in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1972). 
This text is the author's elaborated version of a lecture which he gave in November 1986 at 
<he Theological School in Ljubljana and in the Spring of 1987 in Maribor and at the 
Center "Christian Contemporaneity" in Zagreb. During his visit to the U.S .A. i n  
December 1987 h e  wrote this article on his own initiative. Therefore i t  does not contain 
some of the documentation to which he would have liked to refer otherwise. 
The problem of religious liberties in modern and postmodern societies is certainly 
expressed differently and more radically than in previous societies. Religious liberty as it is 
accepted today was of no use to the pre-technological, pre-industrial, and primarily rural 
civilizations. Such civilization neither accepted it nor desired it. Modem concepts of religious 
liberties for which the majority of humankind opted underline human rights as individual and 
personal as well as the rights of social groups, so that according to the dictate and in accord with 
one's conscience persons freely choose this or that religious or non-religious worldview. Such 
freely chosen convictions can be publicly expressed without impediment and without fear. For the 
purpose of realizing their goals they are able to freely associate and organize. The only limits to 
these rights can be only the rights of those whose attitudes and thoughts are different. In other 
words, the limits of religious liberties of one person can only be the liberty of others, of those 
who differ. Government and public institutions, regardless whether they can be described as 
bourgeois, socialist, neocapitalist, or non-aligned are obligated not only constitutionally to 
guarantee such liberties but also to make them attainable in practice and to defend them, should 
that be needed. This must be emphasized because in our time the main problem is not to what 
degree a state has legally guaranteed religious liberties, but to what degree the state is willing and 
able to fully provide the opportunity to practice these declared religious liberties. This applies 
primarily to the majority of the countries of Europe, North and South America in which the 
Christian civilization is dominant. An analysis of the constitutional regulations of the U.S.S.R. 
and other Eastern European countries would show, however, that the concept of religious liberty as 
defined has not been adequately and completely enunciated. Such limitations also exists in 
countries of the Islamic civilization in which Islam is constitutionally designated as the state or 
national religion. If there are limitations of religious liberties on pa..'i of the state these must be 
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very precisely formulated and enacted only in the interest of the common good (bonum comunae) 
and for the advance of the people, the state, and the citizens. 
Sociological evidence shows that the so-called folk religions in primal or primitive 
societies were somehow the possession and an exclusive privilege of well defined ethnic 
communities. These communities jealously guarded their gods from other communities. In this 
manner they accomplished the complete identification of their ethnic and religious community; 
certain soci� institutions only begin to develop in these societies. In the Middle Ages, at least in 
Europe, the so-called sociological type of Christianity came to full expression according to the 
principle cuius regio eius religio. Societies and states of that time used numerous mechanisms of 
formal and informal social control over social groups and individuals to determine automatically a 
certain religious and ecclesiastic affiliation. These were determined for each person either by birth 
or by parental decision as was the case with the variety of Protestants since the second half of the 
sixteenth century. Those were already the so-called universal religions, which, in distinction from 
the folk religions, in accordance to criteria established by social sciences, were characterized by an 
expansionist, missionary orientation rather than a jealous guarding of their gods. 
The transition, the development of the industrial civilization (of bourgeois and later 
socialist type) brought with them great turnarounds and profound changes in regard to the content 
of religious liberties as components of the totality of human rights. Because of the irresistible 
expansion of all forms of individual and personal human liberties, which is manifested also in the 
mass participation of all social classes and strata in politics, economy, and culture, there is an 
inevitable retreat and marginalization of systems of open repression, bmte force, and terrorism. But 
parallel with it is the simultaneous development of centers of power on the national and 
international level which develop new, even more perfidious mechanisms of hidden, indirect 
repression, especially the very elaborate manipulations with human needs and rights. 1his is the 
so-called system of the "fishermen of human souls." One should never forget this phenomenon 
when one polemicizes, dialogues or analyzes this most important theme of human rights, of the 
rights of the human being as an individual and a person. 
In the modem and postmodem society the national or multinational state is definitively 
constituted and developed as the fundamental form of the existence and development of human 
communities. This state definitively (and without remnants, despite the phenomenon of the so­
called civil society as the alternative to state monopoly) decides the basic conditions of the limits 
of being human as a citizen. Civil society as an alternative form of human community breaks 
through into life and public awareness with great difficulty and remains, earlier or later, in a 
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subordinate position to the state. Also in respect to religious liberties the state appears both as the 
decisive constant and the simultaneous variable. 
Due to the high degree of the institutionalization of a!! human (and religious) activities 
for the space and content of religious liberties the decisive factor becomes and remains the 
relationship between the state and the church, namely between the state and all religious 
organizations from the cult, the sect, and the denomination to the church. A sociological approach 
to the problem of religious freedoms requires and makes possible a scholarly analysis of these 
freedoms with the help of models of the relationship between the state and religious organizations. 
In my earlier investigations I proposed to the scholarly community a theoretical and 
empirical analytic model, which consists of four clear types of the relationship between the state 
and the religious organization. 
1. The first is the type of state religious organization (church). The essential characteristic 
of mutual relations in this type consists primarily in the acceptance, support, and legal 
legitimation by the state of only a single religious teaching, only one, selected religious 
organization. On the other hand, such a selected and by the state preferred religious organization, 
determines by means of its definitions and teachings, what is evil, mistaken, good, bad in accord 
with norms and values of the state. G .  Mensching stated convincingly that the relationships 
between the state and the church are most intimate when a certain state raises a certain church to 
the level of state religion and when such a state religion divinizes the state. The social and political 
might of the state and the church are joined, adapted, and coordinated in such cases. By mutual 
agreement they formulate the patterns of thinking and behaving of citizens. In this type of 
relationship between the state and the religious organization, religious liberties, as we described 
them at the outset of the article, are basically limited. The form of religious thought and behavior 
are determined externally without regard t.o the individual's personal, internal views and attitudes. 
There is freedom for only one religious orientation; all others are either prohibited or somehow 
degraded. There is no freedom for the non-religious orientation. In the European and American 
social arena this type of relations belongs to the past rather than the present. Currently only the 
Islamic states are characterized by and closely approximate the ideals of this type. 
2. The second type is the one in which the state supports and prefers religion as such. 
Historically this type follows chronologically the first type. According to this type the state is 
positively inclined toward all active religions, religious groups, and churches. However, its 
benevolence, and sympathy toward religion as such the state can realize only by establishing 
constitutionally the principle of separation of church and state. Thereby the state decides in favor of 
rel igious pluralism . The religious lifestyle is declared as bei ng desirable and supported by the stale. 
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When we compare this type with the first type we must affirm that it is an advance over the first 
one since it broadens the field of religious liberties. Still, even this type, retains limits and 
contradictions in the functioning of religious liberty. First comes the question whether the state 
can be really supportive of all religious groups equally no matter what their strength, size, and 
composition. Sociological evidence points to the conclusion that the sympathy of the state, 
despite declared equality, is still inclined in favor of the more powerful, influential, and thereby 
more useful religious organizations (the pragmatism of the modem state is here very obvious). I 
Sociological evidence also illustrates that such a state is more or less negatively disposed toward 
all forms of non�religious orientations, especially toward theoretical atheism, regardless whether 
it directly represses the non-religious orientation or whether indirectly the state contributes to the 
creation of a mass public sentiment that atheist thought is undesirable. I believe that this 
constitutes an essential limitation upon religious liberty in the modem sense of the word. 
3. The third type is when the state rejects religion as such. This type is diametrically 
opposed to the type just described. The state, more or less openly, proclaims that religious 
thinking and behavior are undesirable or even forbidden. But usually it proclaims that non­
religious formulations are desirable, supported or even mandatory. Sometimes it proclaims as 
desirable the cult of the state and its leaders.2 There is a variety by which the state ways of 
rejecting or removes the religious elemenLc;, encompassing legal prohibitions or imposing extreme 
or moderate government restrictions of religious manifestations thus removing them from the 
public into the entirely private spheres of life. It is clear that in this kind of state there is no 
religious liberty or, at least, that religious liberties are fundamentally restricted or fettered. It is 
also clear that one can not determine concretely whether a state follows this model primarily by 
means of a comparative analysis of its constitutional i.e. legal framework. Modem states, namely, 
are fairly reluctant to state any limitations of human, including religious liberties in their 
constitutions. An analysis of laws of "lower" rank may prove to be more useful. But only by an 
analysis of the behavior and actions of government agents and of other institutions can one see the 
real situation. A very successful sociological criterion for such an analysis can be the possibility 
or impossibility of social, economic, and particularly political advance of citizens regardless of 
their religious or non-religious convictions and behavior.3 
Sociological investigations show that countries which have more or less explicitly 
rejected the religious orientation, have a parallel manifestation of various forms of so-called secular 
religions, including the direct deification of the state, the cult of their leaders by means of carefully 
spelled out ceremonies of their adoration and veneration, and the religionization of the ideology of 
political parties or of other associations. I do not mean here the so-called civil religion as described 
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by Robert Bellah.4 I am rather pointing to the artificial formation, maintenance, and support of 
only a single ideological system as a religious one, starting with "holy" books and "prophets" to 
ceremonies with pronounced religious symbols. The Nazi and Stalinist societies are excellent 
examples of this type. 
4. The fourth type is the one in which' the state is neutral and indifferent toward religion. I 
defined this type in my earlier works as being "historically-potential," namely a type which we 
can only discern, prognosticate, and also hope for as a referential frame, which could broaden the 
space of religious liberties to unimaginable extents. It should make no difference to the state 
whether and how people believe or do not believe. Decisions about it, without exceptions, should 
be in the hands, conscience, and hearts of people, human beings as individuals and persons and as 
members of various social groups. The state would be neither enthusiastic nor unenthusiastic 
about religious or non-religious orientations; neither prohibit nor limit them, nor would it be 
inclined or disinclined toward them. The state (or the wielders of power in the state) would 
consciously step back from any mixing or involvement in religious or non-religious convictions 
and from any conscious or unconscious manipulation of these convictions. Certainly, one of the 
basic conditions for the realization of such behavior by the state and its leaders is also the explicit 
willingness and attitude by religious organizations to reject any external preference of their 
teachings and specifically any involvement and participation in political processes. Religious 
organizations would reject the involvement in public governing as well as from excercising any 
influence upon their membership as to how they are to act in political life. Sociological analysis 
points to certain changes in modem and postmodern societies, which may be indicators of the 
creation of broader social conditions for the promotion of this fourth type, which I called earlier, a 
"positive utopia:•S One of these conditions could certainly be the process of the socialization of 
the state. Sociological analysis of this process in various societies of the contemporary world 
could certainly provide a more exact answer to the question whether and to what degree there may 
be a transfer of political power to citizens as such. The above mentioned concept of civil society as 
an alternative to the state can without any doubt be considered as a conscious activity of people and 
a significant theoretical reflection about this process. 
In my opinion the key question in this regard is the question of social institutions and 
their role in modern society. Through important the state is only one of those institutions. 
Another one is the church which is the most developed form of a religious organization. Social 
institutions (in the sociological sense of the word) are certainly the result of "natural" development 
of human society, but they are somehow, also in a certain respect also an alienated form of human 
activity. They were created "by human hand" and somehow serve human interests because they 
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regulate relations between people. At the same time they also fetter and limit the possibilities of 
further spontaneous human action. Social institutions are in principle rigid. They are very 
suspicious toward any innovation and always press like a nightmare upon an individual human 
being. Social institutions likewise, with great difficulty and with great delay, adapt to social 
changes. Institutions tolerate human spontaneity with difficulty, because spontaneity in principle 
go beyond the limits of institutionalized human relations. However, modem, and even more so 
postmodem society is marked by the awakening of spontaneity, that which is humanly impulsive6 
yet meaningful behavior and activity. This awakening is displayed in many instances of popular 
protest, contesting, and refusal to cooperate both within as well as against institutions. 
Sociological evidence points to these protests within religious organizations, political parties, 
families, the state, and specifically also within the Communist movement and parties. Human 
enthusiasm and the favoring of spontaneity, of meaningful impulsiveness (one might say, as an 
alternative to the norms and standards of institutions) in principle does not mean choosing anarchy. 
Thoughtful impulsiveness means first of all that the person alone select ways and means of 
achieving one's concepts according to the criteria of one's own conscience. Thus the only 
reasonable limit are L'le ways and means of other people who seek to realize their own concepts. 
These ways and means must be consciously and conscientiously mutually adapted and coordinated 
and thereby seck to achieve a freely coordinated activity for the attainment of joint goals and 
values. These foster development and progress in the accomplishment of social justice and mutual 
respect. 
If we prognosticate that the future development of society will include on one hand 
institutional retreat but the advance and broadening of the spontaneous then we can prognosticate 
certain possibilities for expanding the area of religious liberties. Until now the relationship 
between society and religion had been expressed primarily and traditionally as the relationship 
between the state and the religious organization. Under the conditions of the advance of the 
spontaneity this traditional relationship of church and state will increasingly retreat and be 
abrogated. It will simply lose its meaning. Again, it seems to me that this is a utopia. But the 
principle of utopia is one of the foundations which gives meaning to our life. The principle of 
utopia--and the principle of hope which is related to it (Ernst Bloch)--are the one's which 
give strength, happiness, and satisfaction to many people, to be able to see opportunities for the 
future in the troubles of daily life and to be able to work for the future. Utopia is to be able to see 
that kind of future, which would provide greater human possibilities and space, one where in daily 
life they would realize all their dreams. Thus we can say with great certainty that in a future 
spontaneous society there will be a fuller measure of religious liberties. That will be a freedom 
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like an ocean without shores, without present limits. The only limit, which at the same time is 
also the most open horizon, would be another human being rather than regulations, norms, and 
reflections which are prescribed by social institutions. Such hope is finally ba<>cd also on the fact 
that previous human developments, among them religious liberty, were constantly enlarged and 
extended beyond established IimiL<>. 
The theme of religious liberties is very important also for socialist societies, which can 
certainly be classified as modem. However, we must state at the outset, that socialist states as we 
know them in their empirical reality have not yet passed their historical test in regard to religious 
freedoms. The space for these freedoms is pretty closed, limited, and full of obstacles. There were 
and still are practices which point to the existence of real religious persecutions. The same 
situation exists also on the "other side." Many religious organization show in reality that they did 
not transcend many stereotypes about socialism, and even more so about Marxism and 
communism, toward which their attitudes range from distrust and indecisiveness to opposition. 
Certainly there are differences among socialist countries as well as among religious organizations. 
My basic interpretative hypothesis for the religious situation in socialist countries is that in regard 
to religious life there is the decisive intervention of "modus operandi," namely, the concrete 
activity and behavior of both the state and the religious organization. This should not be 
interpreted as an attempt to balance the responsibility of each for the situation with which we 
surely cannot be satisfied. The concept of a balanced responsibility is directly contradictory to my 
statements above by which I incontestably affirmed that the state, especially the socialist states, 
has achieved the greatest possible concentration of social and political power, and this directly 
affects the limits of religious frecdoms.7 
It is not due to some patriotic emotions or some personal conformity that leads me to 
assert that a comparative analysis shows that the amount of religious freedom is greater in 
Yugoslavia than in the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries. Thereby I do not wish to 
negate that even in Yugoslavia in this respect there are a number of open themes and questionable 
behavior which unjustifiably limits religious liberties. 
It is not the purpose of this article to specifically analyze the religious situation in 
Yugoslavia yet as an illustration, a few key issues can be identified. The leading role of the League 
of Communists is maintained, at least for the time being, by means of a political monopoly by 
this party. This restricts the social and political advancement of citizens who are not party 
members. Empirical investigations have shown limitations of religious freedoms especially in the 
advancement in the political careers of believers, in the upbringing and education, in the Yugoslav 
People's Army, and in the mass media. Marxism still functions as a preferred ideology; in the 
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promotion of this goal sometimes all means seem acceptable. Limitations have been played upon 
the traditional charitable activities of religious organizations. And there are certain undefined areas, 
the so-called "mixing of religion into politics" for which the professional leadership of the 
churches is more or less accused. 
Without going into a detailed and concrete analysis of the religious situation in socialist 
countries I must state that in those countries religious liberties will continue to be restricted as 
long as they retain their preference for the so-called Bolshevik (Leninist) model of social 
organization and rule.8 As Leninist I consider that model, which is based on the principle of the 
obligatory political, economic, cultural and ideological monolythism and dictation,9 based on the 
principles of democratic centralism (not only of the party but also of society), on the concept of an 
increasing class struggle within socialism, and clearly also on the axiomatic assertion that the 
struggle for the abolition of religion is the conditio sine qua non of the struggle for a socialist, 
humanistic society. In the U.S.S.R. Gorbachev's perestroika certainly facilitates the evolution of 
this model. However, already in the 1950s Yugoslavia abandoned this model with the help of the 
concept of socialist selfmanagement. Nevertheless one must admit that even in Yugoslavia certain 
components of that model still continue to act either as a conscious orientation or as a tradition 
which is difficult to ,uproot. This phenomenon can be observed in the U.S.S.R. and in other 
countries of "real socialism," despite perestroika and other visible changes. It survives there for the 
very same reasons as it does in Yugoslavia. 
Without attempting a concrete analysis of activities of various religious organizations we 
must also conclude that conflicts between socialist states and religious organizations will continue 
as long as these organization keep reproducing the prestige and the power of the tradition of 
militant anti-communism, antisocialism, and of an exclusivist anthropological worldview. When 
the prevalent conviction and deliberation in religious organizations continues to hold that the 
social order and organization can be just only if it is based on religious values, they will continue 
to regenerate the tradition of spiritual and religious totalitarianism. 
I am concluding these thoughts with the expression of my deep conviction both as a man 
and as a sociologist, that in the very structure of the modem and postmodem society (whether of 
the "Western" or "Eac;tern" variant) many social, political, cultural, and ideological mechanisms are 
at work, which limit human freedoms and the full realization of all recognized and known human 
rights, among them also religious. The humanistic convictions is that in the contemporary world 
peace is indivisible. Therefore we cannot tolerate or be indifferent to wars or other forms a ruthless 
physical violence in one part of the world and at the same time be enthusiastic promoters of peace 
in other parts of this interdependent world. The same humanistic conviction ought to hold sway in 
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respect to human freedoms. They too, cannot be divided. We cannot be enthusiastic and promote, 
for inslance, economic or political freedoms on one side while on the other be indifferent to 
cultural, national, or religious unfrcedom. Likewise we cannot defend religious or cultural right<; 
and be indifferent to the flagrant infringement of economic or political rights of people. And so 
forth. 
The defense of full human liberties and rights will be successful only when all 
dimensions of liberty, its creation in all parts of the world will be promoted by all people 
regardless of their worldviews or (non)religious personal orienlation and organizational affiliation 
or membership. The paths for the creation of such a humanistic project are difficult. One among 
them is cerlainly the unconditional mutual respect of people regardless of their worldviews, and 
one might add, having a fanatical love for those who are different. The dialogue between Christians 
and Marxists is a very appropriate referential framework for such efforts. 
Translated from Serbo-Croatian 
by Dr. Paul Mojzes 
Rosemont College, Rosemont, PA 
1 How difficult it is to maintain this balance by the state toward religious pluralism is obvious also 
in the U.S.A. in its relation toward Catholics, ProtestanL�. and Jews a� the largest and most influential among 
religious organizations. 
2Earlier sociological literature mentions Nazi Germany and the cult of Hitler as a pure historical 
example. The same is the case of the practice of socialist states of Eastern Europe and particularly of Albania, 
which has simply legally prohibited all religions. 
3This criterion is being applied in our empirical sociological research in Yugoslavia. 
4Namely, real civil religion is not "reserved" only for the state and society which reject traditional 
religions but is viewed as an "alternative religion" which appears in all modem and postmodem societies. 
5Jn my previous publications I called these changes "social conditions which are alive," identified 
them concretely and even quantified them. 
6[Translator's note: the key term which Rater uses is proizvoljno which connotes a voluntary 
decision for which the self may not wish to account to anyone. The closest synonyms may be, freely selected, 
arbitrary, willful, unpremeditated, spontaneous. The antonym would be predetermined or deliberate.I have 
chosen "impulsive" as the closest in meaning.] 
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7Both the state and the church have the responsibility for their actions and have no rights to justify 
their actions by the blaming the behavior of "the other side." 
81 am certainly among those who distinguish between Leninism and Stalinism. However, I believe 
that there arc structural limiL� of freedom even in Lenin's conceptualizations. In my opinion the recent time 
period more or less requires transcending Lenin's theorizing. 
9[Translator's note: Roter here uses the coinage dirigizam, which comes from the term dirigirati, to 
conduct, as in an orchestra, namely to dictate from the top what the entire group must do. 
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